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Thetopic "realoutputandthe gold standard" describesin somesensethe
ultimate objective of our quest to balance the costs and benefits of the
gold standard. Per capita real income, the aggregate embodiment ofthe
national standard ofliving, is a touchstone ofany broad macroeconomic
policy. Ifwe can show, for example, that real income is higher or grows
faster under a set ofrules termed a gold standard than under alternative
monetary arrangements, then we are well on the way toward new policy
prescriptions and a truly new economic order. This papermakes no such
claims. Instead I focus ona much narrowerandless dramaticsetofissues
that may ultimately, but not immediately, shed light on the grander
question. My task, here, is to characterize the behavior ofreal output in
severalnations thatwere linkedin severalways duringthe mostsustained
period of a worldwide operating gold standard.
The paper consists of two sections. Section 11.1 deals with eight
nations in Europe and North America during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to determinewhetherthere was anAtlanticeconollJY
in the sense that changes in real output in one country were eitb~r
correlated with or caused changes in real output in other nations. In
addition, I try to discover whetherthe general move to the gold standard
made an appreciable difference to the links among national incomes.
Section 11.2 asks whether there is any evidence to support the natural-
rate hypothesis during the gold standard years in much the same way as
Lucas (1973) examined the output-inflation tradeoff of the post-World
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War II period; then the model is extended to test whether the price level
is more appropriatelycharacterized as endogenous orexogenous to most
countries during the period. To state the conclusions most succinctly:
There is little evidence of an Atlantic economy as far as real-income
movements are concerned, there is some evidencein favor ofthe natural-
rate hypothesis, and in some countriesthe elasticityofaggregate demand
is very large.
11.1 The Behavior of Real Output before and after 1879
11.1.1 Dating the Gold Standard
1
The years between 1879 and 1914 are usually referred to as the gold
standardperiod. Inthis erathe UnitedStates joinedthe UnitedKingdom
and most ofthe rest ofthe economicworld in adopting the gold standard.
Britain eliminated restrictions on gold exports and required the Bank of
England to redeem its notes in gold (or coin) in 1821. By 1850 both the
United States and France had effectively moved to the gold standard.
2
During the 1860s, the United States joined Germany, Italy (1866), Rus-
sia, and Austria-Hungary with inconvertible currencies. In July 1873
Germany moved to the gold standard, and by 1879 most nations had
more or less adopted policies consistent with gold. The exceptions were
Japan,India, Russia, andAustria-Hungary. These, too, joinedtherest of
the world in 1895 orso, and the regime persisted until the start ofWorld
War I, although Italy formally adhered to the gold standard only during
the decade 1884--94.
3
11.1.2 Models of Real Output during the Gold Standard Years
Most discussions ofthe gold standard tend to focus on how institutions
oreconomic variables worked under that regime-the behavior ofbanks
and banking systems, relative prices and price levels, interest rates,
foreign trade, the balanceofpaymentsandgoldflows.
4Inmostmacroeco-
nomic models these variables are associated with changes in real income.
National macroeconomic models typically have several windows to the
rest of the world. In the case of Keynesian income-expenditure models,
these windows include terms-of-trade effects, the direct effect offoreign
demand on domestic goods, and a relationship between foreign and
domestic interest rates that affects capitalflows. Recent monetarist mod-
els tend to stress a natural-rate hypothesis coupled with assumptions
about the way in which expectations are formed, making a sharp distinc-
tion between anticipated and unanticipated magnitudes of exogenous
variables.
5 Since these models typically focus on quarterly or yearly
fluctuations over relatively short periods, it is not surprising that they
ignore otherchannels by which real outputmay be altered. Most notably515 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
in the nineteenth century, the movementoflaborinternationallyand the
opening of new land for settlement had some effects on the behavior of
real income.
6
Theusual modelofthe nineteenth-centurygold standardhastendedto
examine the interrelationships among exogenous variables in one coun-
try andtheway in which, say, the balance ofpayments, trade, andcapital
account behavedin theother. The question posedhere is a different one.
It is not whether exports, for example, increase when there is an exoge-
nous rise in income abroad, but rather whether the total effect of the
increase in income abroad is enough to raise income significantly in
another country. By implicitly aggregating across all the channels by
which international excess demands are transmitted, this study seeks to
discover whether national incomes, nominal or real, are linked.
Two works that stand as major efforts to explain the behavior of real
output during the gold standard are those by Oskar Morgenstern (1959)
and Brinley Thomas (1973). Morgenstern studies the behavior of four
countries-the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Ger-
many-by looking at NBER-reference-cycle peaks and troughs. His
analysis suggests that during the gold standard period (prior to World
War I), the association of the business cycle of the three European
nations was relatively close, and that between Europe and the United
States was less close. To reach these conclusions, Morgenstern forms a
contingency table of months in which various countries were in similar
phases of their business cycles-up phases or down phases-and finds a
low probability that the observed number of concurrent up and down
phases would be observed by chance (pp. 51-73). This methodology is
flawed in several ways. First, the reference-cycle data do not abstract
from the underlying growth rate observed in all countries. The approach
yields a closer association of business cycles, measured as months of
shared up or down phases, than would be true if the cycles, net of the
underlying growth rates, were measured. And second, with only six to
ten business cycles observed in the four countries, any relationship that
relies onthe cycle itselfas a fundamental unit ofobservation hasveryfew
degrees offreedom. Since only up and down movements ofthe cycle are
examined, amplitude ofmovements is ignored. In addition, the average
duration of the cycles among the four countries-between forty-three
and seventy months-makes it difficult to accept inferences about the
intercountry relationships among the cycles?
Brinley Thomas's Migration and Economic Growth (1973) is probably
the most detailed analysis of the period. Thomas's model organizes the
dataabouta moreorless informalopenKeynesianmultiplier-accelerator
view ofthe world in which the United Kingdom is the hub. Exports and
capital formation depend upon the level of population and migration
which in turn depend upon both the natural growth of population and516 Stephen T. Easton
relative income levels among countries. The gestation period for invest-
ment and the natural cycle of population provide for the complex lags
observed in a myriad of time series that Thomas correlates. The gold
standard provides the international regime, but interest rates set in the
United Kingdom mark the tempo to which the nominal monetary aggre-
gates dance. He rejects the monetary approach to the balance of pay-
ments out ofhand. Thomas finds interrelationships between a variety of
time series among nations. He builds a coherent explanation primarily
from observationsthatparticularseriespeakedandtroughedtogether, or
that one followed another at a reasonable lag. The various peaks and
troughs are oftenstrikingly apparent, butlittle is done to relate the series
to one another in a statistical sense. Thomas is usually concerned with
long cycles----oftenortwentyyears in duration-buthedoes notestimate
systematic behavior explicitly, and the series he studies have wide varia-
tions in periodicity.
My task is considerably less ambitious. I focus on a single aggregate
measure, real GNP, and askwhetherthereis any evidence ofthe Atlantic
economy in the behavior ofthat measure among countries. By breaking
the time period in two-pre-1879 and post-1878-1 try to assess possible
differences introducedbythe UnitedStates' move to gold. Thestrategyis
first to look at simple correlations among country real outputs, much as
Thomas does, to determine whetherthe relationships thathe finds can be
observed, and then to apply Granger-Sims tests to determine whether
movements in income ofonecountrycause income to change in another.
11.1.3 Simple Correlations
Tables11.1 and11.2providethesimplecorrelationsamongthe outputs
ofa number ofnations. The unit ofreal output is the annual deviation of
the log of actual GNP from the log of (exponential) trend GNP. Using
this smoothingdevice is customary, although moresophisticatedfilters to
achieve mean and covariance stationary processes might prove fruitful.
Thedatalimitations are rathersevere. Thegold standardperiodlasted at
most a mere thirty-five years, and some have argued that it lasted only
fifteen. Since real-output series for several countries are available only
since 1870, the data are limited in the other direction as well.
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 give a bird's-eye view ofwhat a simple year-by-
yearcomparison among realoutputsreveals. Inthe tables, a blankmeans
that the correlation was not statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
Although I corrected for autocorrelation in the residuals of the correla-
tions, I show the uncorrected simple correlations in table 11.1. Eyeball
comparisonsofpeaksandtroughswouldnotcorrectforsuch autocorrela-
tions andthecorrectionmightsuggest a misleadinglysanguineview ofthe
simple relationships. In table 11.2, I note shifts from significant to insig-517 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
Table 11.1 Simple Correlations of Real-Output Deviations from Trend, 183~79
No. of
Obser- US CN UK GER ITL DEN NOR SWD
vations (37) (12) (50) (30) (19) (10) (15) (10)
US X - .6**
CN X
UK X .3* -.5* .65** .5*





Sources: US = United Statesvalues using Gallman (1968) data from 1830; no observations
from 1860to 1869. CN = Canadianvalues from 1869 (Dick 1978). UK = United Kingdom
based on Mitchell (1975) from 1830 and Feinstein (1972) from 1855. GER, ITL, DEN,
NOR, SWD = Germany, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden based on Mitchell 1975.
Notes: The table shows correlationcoefficients betweencountrypairsoflog deviations from
the log ofthe trend ofreal GNP (or NNP). No entry = no significant correlation at the 0.10
level; * = significant at the 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 or better.
Table 11.2 Simple Correlations of Real-Output Deviations from Trend,
1879--1913
US CN UK GER ITL DEN NOR
US X .5** .4** - .7** .3'
CN X -.4' .3* -.02*'
UK X - .4** - .5** - .3*
GER X










Sources: Same as for table 11.1.
Notes: There are 35 observationsfor eachcorrelation. No entry = no significantcorrelation
at the 0.10 level; * = significant at the 0.10level; ** = significant at the 0.05 level; , = not
significant at the 0.10 level when autocorrelations accounted for although apparently
significant before the correction; *' = significant at 0.10 level after correction for autocor·
relation.
nificant coefficients depending on whether correction is made for auto-
correlation in the residuals.
1830-79
During theyears priorto the United States' return to the gold standard
excluding the Civil War decade, there is no evidence ofa simple associa-518 Stephen T. Easton
tion of real output in the United States and the United Kingdom. The
U.S. measure is negatively associated with Canadian output and with no
other country measure although, with the exception ofthe United King-
dom, there are few observations for correlations with other countries.
Canadian output, like that ofthe United States, appears to be indepen-
dent of the measure for the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe.
Fluctuationsin outputin the United Kingdom are associated moreorless
strongly with output changes in Norway, Denmark, and Germany, and
are negatively related to those changes in Italy. Changes in real outputin
Germany also appearto berelatedto thosein the Scandinaviancountries
and, to a leser extent, to those in the United Kingdom. A degree of
positive association exists among real outputs ofthe Scandinavian coun-
tries. Thus in this early period some association of outputs is evident
within Europe, with the United Kingdom displaying the most significant
numberofassociationsin thegroupofcountriesI examine. Little associa-
tion of output is evident between Europe and North America.
1879-1913
During the gold standard era, U.S. output appears to be positively
associated with that in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway, and
negatively associated with that in Germany. Canadian output, however,
as in the earlier period, remains unrelated to output in the United
Kingdom, but is positively associated with output in the United States.
Output in the United Kingdom now is negatively correlated with output
in Germany, Italy, and Norway, whereas the association in the earlier
period had tended to be positive. That negative relationship is the one
that Thomas finds and upon which several of his hub-periphery inter-
pretations of the time series depend.
Real output in Germany is negatively associated with that in both
Canada and the United States and in the United Kingdom and unrelated
to other European outputs. Real output in the Scandinavian countries
and Italy appears positively associated more strongly than before 1879,
and the negative relationship between Italy's and the United Kingdom's
real output persists as in the earlier period. Real output in Italy also
displays a slight positive correlation with that in Canada. Note that the
outputlinks among Denmark, Norway, andSweden become much stron-
ger in the later period. In 1885 central-bank reserves ofanyone country
could be located in central banks ofthe othertwo and still serve as a basis
for domestic currency issue.
Significant simple correlations among real-output changes in many
countries provide no evidence ofcausal impetus. They do not by them-
selves support the notion that the United Kingdom was the hub around
which at least some nations revolved. Common cyclical movements519 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
amongthe Europeannations are notsufficient evidence thattheywere in
a state of causal dependency upon one another.
8
Although the associations in tables 11.1 and 11.2provide a methodfor
analyzingthebehaviorofreal-outputmovements-onethatunderliesthe
casualcomparisonoftimeseriesbymanyauthors-thereis analternative
methodology-the Granger and Sims tests for causality.
11.1.4 The Granger Test
Onemethodofdefining causalityhas beentosay thatX causes Y ifpast
values of X significantly affect Y, once past values of Y have been
considered. In a regression framework, if the bis of equation (1) are
significant, then X is said to cause Y (Granger 1969).
(1)
00 00
Yr = ao + I ai Yr-i + I biXt- 1 + Ut,
i=1 i= 1
where Ut is white noise. By placing X on the left-hand side one can also
test to see whether Y causes X.
The Sims test (1972), an alternative that amounts to the same thing
asymptotically, is to regress Y on both past andfuture values ofX. Ifthe
coefficients on the future values of X prove significant, i.e., the ais in
equation (2), the conclusion is that Y causes X.
(2)
00 00
Yr = ao + I aiXt+l + I biXt- 1 + Ute
i=l i+O
Sargent (1979, pp. 277-92) provides a helpful discussion of the theory
underlying the test and some examples.
Table 11.3 reports the results ofa Granger test, equation (1) with four
lags, on the bivariate relationships among changes in national outputs.
9
Table 11.3 should be read as follows. Row-head country output causes
Table 11.3 Granger Causal Links between National Real Outputs, 1881-1913
US eN UK GER ITL DEN NOR SWD
US X .25 .10 .25 .25
eN x .25 .25 .25 .25 .05
UK .25 .10 X .25 .01 .25
GER .05 X .10
ITL .25 .10 X
DEN .25 .05 X .25
NOR .25 .25 X .25
SWD .05 .05 .25 X
Notes: Read across the rows for causal direction. Row-head country causes column-head
country at the significance level in the table. Each column-head country is caused by the
row-relatedelementsin thecolumn. A blankindicates asignificance levelgreaterthan0.25.520 Stephen T. Easton
column-head country output at the significance level reported in the
table. In the first row there is no causal connection between output
changes in the United States and Canada at the 0.25 significance level or
better. There is, however, a causal relationship flowing from the United
Statesto the United Kingdom at the 0.25 significance level. According to
the UnitedStatescolumn, outputin the UnitedStatesis caused by output
in the UnitedKingdom andin Norway, eachatthe0.25 significance level,
and in Germany at the 0.05 confidence level. These unusually lax signifi-
cance levels have been chosen so as to give as much latitude as possible
for the display of bivariate relationships.
The key feature oftable 11.3 is that ofthe 56 possible bivariate causal
relationships, 27 are significant at the 0.25 confidence level, ofwhich 10
are significant at the 0.10 level, 6atthe 0.05 confidence level, and 1at the
0.01 confidence level. This pattern casts considerable doubt on any
systematiccausal relationships among theoutputs.
tO Atthe usual 0.05-or-
bettersignificance level, Canadaandthe UnitedKingdom causeNorway,
Germany causes the United States, Denmark and Sweden cause Italy,
andSweden causes Denmark. These relationships are not very attractive
since theoutputofsmallcountriesappearsto bedetermining thatoflarge
countries more often than the otherway round. Certainly there is almost
no evidence of a systematic hub-periphery relationship between the
UnitedKingdom andothercountriesandlittle evidencetosuggest alarge
numberofbivariate causal relationships during the gold standardperiod.
The simple correlations of tables 11.1 and 11.2 may arise either from a
common externalforce orfrom concurrent domestic conditions, butthey
do not indicate significant bivariate causation between national outputs.
To see what patterns might emerge if the period is not limited to the
classical gold standard years, 1881-1913, table 11.4 examines the same
patterns ofbivariate causal links for different dates. In table11.4-asin
table 11.3, row-head nation causes column-head nation-there is little
evidence ofsystematic relationships, although the United Kingdom does
seemtodisplaymorecausallinks atmoreexactingsignificance levels than
any other nation, and its links with Germany and Canada are not un-
reasonable.
The reasons for such poor causal links among nations may be due to
measurementerrorsin thedatathatraise the noise-to-signal ratio beyond
acceptable bounds. Relatively few observations are available at best. To
supplement the Granger causal relationships, table 11.5 uses a Sims test
to examine the full range ofdata available for each country.11 Once again
the pattern of causations reflected in table 11.5, like that of tables 11.3
and 11.4, shows little evidence ofsystematic causal relationships. It may
be reasonable that U.S. and U.K. real outputs caused Canadian real
output, but it seems odd that Denmark's real output should have a

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.522 Stephen T. Easton
Table 11.5 Sims Causal Links between National Real Outputs, 1830-1913
US eN UK GER ITL DEN NOR SWD
US X .05 .06
eN .22 x .12
UK .05 X .10 .16 .17 .06
GER X .05
ITL .10 .10 X .15
DEN .15 .05 X
NOR X
SWD .10 X
Notes: Read across the rows for causal direction. Row-head country causes column-head
country at the significance level in the table. Each column-head country is caused by the
row-related elements in the column. A blank indicates that the significance level was not at
least 0.22.
A natural objectionto the above approach is thatit imposes too rigid a
relationship between the outputs of the countries in our sample. In
particular the Granger-Sims tests yield a causal association between
outputsonly ifthe same causal pattern is observed throughout the series.
For this to be the case in the context of national-output movements, a
disturbance in the United Kingdom, say, must be transmitted to the
UnitedStatesin every episode in the samefashion. This relationship may
be reasonable if the United Kingdom is thought to be the leading nation,
and all shocks have the same effect upon the participants. For example,
an increase in U.K. output always raises or lowers output in the other
country.
But consider the possibility-suggested by Geoffrey Wood in com-
menting on an earlier version of this paper-that in one episode a
domestic shock to. demand tends to stimulate output abroad, and in
another episode the shock to domestic supply tends to reduce output
abroad. Thatpossibilityis theonemostlikely toobscuretheinternational
causal links between real outputs-though one can easily imagine a
model in which a positive supplyshockstimulatestheforeign economyas
well. When there is no simple positive or negative association between
national incomes, the Granger-Sims tests show no relationship. Yet one
country has caused the output in another to change.
One way to check whether positive or negative changes in one coun-
try's output are transmitted to those ofanother country is to examine the
links among the absolute values of output deviations. The question is
whether a shock, in either demand or supply, say, that affects domestic
output, measuredby the absolutevalue ofthe change in domestic output,
is associated with a change in the absolute value ofoutput abroad. Thus
thesame methodology as beforeserves, onlynow theunitsofobservation
are the absolute values of the deviations from trend levels of national
outputs.523 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
The results for both the gold standard years and the entire sample
period are consistent with the earlier finding that there is no systematic
evidence that changes in one country's output are related in a Granger-
Sims fashion to outputs in other countries (tables 11.A.1 and 11.A.2 of
the Appendix).
Anotherpossible reason that no evidence emergesofsignificant bivari-
ate relationships is that the true underlying relationship may be between
groups ofcountries. The technique used here does notreject the possibil-
ity that blocs of nations, the Scandinavian countries, for example, are
more relevant. for causal connections than each nation in the bloc
individually.12
Thelack ofcausal dependencyofnational outputs upon one anotheris
an important issue in several contexts. The notion that one country was
an engine ofeconomic expansion orcontractionfor an Atlanticeconomy
is dubious at the aggregate level. This is not to say that particular
components ofnational output were not strongly related to one another.
Investment in the United States, for example, might have been affected
by investment in the United Kingdom. But at the level of aggregate
outputs, the relationships do not appearto have beenparticularlystrong.
Money-demand studies such as those that underlie the monetary
approach to the balance ofpayments typically assume the independence
of real national incomes. At least on a pairwise basis, the assumption
appears to be justified. Finally, whatever the many channels by which
disturbances were transmitted from economy to economy, the sum of
those disturbances (bilaterally) from one national output to another
appears to have beenweak during the gold standardperiod. Changesin a
nation's output were determined by domestic and possibly international
variables, but not in a simple leader-follower fashion.13
Theresults ofthis section are largely negative, showinglittle indication
of bilateral relationships among the real outputs .of various nations.
Another approach is to ask whether real-output changes during the gold
standardyearscorrespondtocurrentexperienceandtheory. Section 11.2
explores the output-inflation tradeoff in the past and asks whether there
is any evidence for the historical periodofa "naturalrate" ofreal-output
growth.
11.2 Output, Inflation, and the Domestic Determination of Prices
Insection 11.1 littleevidenceemergedofbivariaterelationships among
national outputs during the gold standard period. Section 11.2 examines
the interconnectedness of real output from a different perspective. The
perspectiveis amodelofeacheconomybasedonamaintainedhypothesis
that both the price level and the level ofoutput are endogenously deter-
mined by domestic conditions. The closed-economy model, developed524 Stephen T. Easton
originally by Lucas (1973), assumes that the elasticity of the aggregate
demand schedule is unity. The model is then recast (Arak 1977) to allow
for the possibility ofa nonunitary aggregate-demand elasticity. The pre-
sumption of the analysis is that very high estimated price elasticities of
demand are consistent with the view that countries were small. The
relevant price level in that case is an international price level exogenous
to the home country. In the event, the evidence is mixed. Although high
elasticities of demand are present-some are infinite-the estimates are
not sufficiently precise to rule out a unitary elasticity in most cases.
Since the Lucas model has been of great interest as a device for
exposing and testing a rational-expectations approach to the Phillips
curve/4 section 11.2.1 reports results of tests similar to those used by
Lucas. Lucas's datawere drawnfrom thepost-WorldWarII era, andit is
at least ofpassing interest to see how the same tests fare with data from
the gold standard era. Section 11.2.3 estimates the elasticity of the
aggregate demand schedule and describes a model that allows the price
level to become, in effect, an exogenous variable.
15 Estimates of the
elasticity of demand give some information on the degree to which
countries were able to determine their own price levels. Although the
evidence is mixed, as was apparent in the conference papers and the
discussion from the floor, the speed with which nations adjusted to
international prices is still an unsettled issue (McCloskey and Zecher
1976, and their paper in this volume).
11.2.1 Lucas's Model
The cyclical behavior of aggregate supply, Yct, is assumed to depend
upon the discrepancy between the actual and expected price level, plus a
lagged value ofcyclical real output (where all variables are measured in
natural logarithms) so that
I6
(3) Yct = ~[Pr - Et(PtIIt)] + ~Yc,t-l·
Usinginformationabouttheaverage pricelevel and the observedprice in
the local market, the aggregate-supply function can be written as:
(4) Yt = Ynt + e~(Pr - ~) + ~[Yt-l - Yn,t-l] ,
whereYnt refers to thesecularlevel ofrealoutputcommon to all markets,
P t, the known mean level of prices, and
1'2 e=---
(12 + 1'2 '
where 'T
2 is the variance ofdeviations oflocal prices from P t and (12 is the
variance of the overall price level.
Assume that the demand for goods can be represented in a simple
form:525 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
(5) Yt + Pr = Xt,
where Xt refers to the (log of) nominal income. Assume thatchanges in Xt
are normally distributed and are independent with mean 8 and variance
(1;. The reduced forms for Yet and 1i.Pt are:
(6) Yet = -11'8 + 11'1i.xt + AYe,t-l ,
(7) 1i.Pr = - ~ + (1 - 11')1i.xt+ 11'1i.xt- 1 - A1i.Ye,t-l ,
where ~ = the (exponential) trend growth rate of real output,




(1 - 11')2(1; + 72(1 + 'Y) .
From equations (6), (7), and the definition of 11', it follows that when (1;
becomes large, 11' approaches zero, and demand shocks have little effect
on real output, being increasingly absorbed as price-level changes. Thus,
a prediction ofthe theory is thatvalues of 11' should decline as the sample
variance of nominal income changes (1i.xt) increases.
11.2.2 The Evidence
Table 11.6 reports a summary of the country-by-country regression
results. In the table the first two columns display values of 11' and Awhich
are drawn from the regression results ofequation (6), the reduced form
for cyclical income. The R 2 associated with regression equation (6) is in
column3, andtheR 2 associatedwith equation (7) is in column4. Column
5 contains the variance ofnominal-income changes for each ofthe coun-
tries and relevant time periods. The time periods have been constructed
so that they coverinteresting periodsofa reasonable length. Ineachcase
the three decades 1881-1913 are distinguished from the precedingyears.
For most countries at least a few observations are available for years
before the world gold standard era. The table gives the estimates for the
full run of data and for subperiods.
Two basic tests ofthe model are presented. The first test, whether the
country-by-country regressions fit well, gives generally favorable evi-
dence. TheR2,s ofthe different equationsrangefrom .33 to .94 with most
of the values falling around .75-the same order of magnitude as those
Lucas (1973) obtained for more recent data. A second encouraging
finding is that the values of 11' and Awith two exceptions fall within the
interval zero-to-unity which is consistent with theoretical expectations.
I7
Althoughcertainly notconclusive, these features ofthe model are gener-
ally supportive of the approach.
A less encouragingpictureis presentedin figure 11.1 where 11' is plotted526 Stephen T. Easton
Table 11.6 Summary Statistics
Coefficient Coefficient Variance
on Nominal- on Lagged ofNominal-
Income Real Cycli- Income
Change 7T cal Output A Percentage
(s.e.) (s.e.) R2 Rip Changes Yet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Canada
1870-1913 .69 .91 .82 .33 .00864
(.07) (.07)
1881-1913 .73 .98 .84 .33 .00758
(.09) (.08)
Germany
1854-1913 .32 .76 .61 .74 .00498
(.05) (.06)
1854-1879 .36 .83 .49 .74 .00749
(.10) (.18)
1879-1913 .31 .64 .70 .74 .00328
(.06) (.09)
Italy
1866-1883 .22 .59 .56 .83 .00603
(.07) (.16)
1884-1894 .32 .71 .55 .68 .00356
(.15) (.26)
1895-1913 .52 .97 .95 .79 .00541
(.07) (.06)
1881-1913 .46 .94 .92 .78 .00569
(.05) (.05)
Norway
1893-1913 .15 1.01 .75 .92 .00293
(.06) (.14)
Sweden
1863-1913 .51 .82 .79 .66 .00511
(.06) (.07)
1863-1879 .51 .84 .79 .70 .00811
(.09) (.13)
1881-1913 .54 .74 .79 .63 .00378
(.07) (.10)
United Kingdom
1832-1913 .19 .82 .73 .87 .00410
(.03) (.06)
1832-1859 .16 .70 .70 .94 .00832
(.04) (.11)
1881-1913 .23 .86 .71 .77 .00209
(.08) (.10)
United States
1834-1859 .48 .65 .76 .54 .00400
(.08) (.10)
1881-1913 .76 .96 .92 .56 .00318
(.06) (.06)
Sources: Realoutputas in table 11.1. Prices: Canada(Dick 1981); Germany, Italy, Norway,
Sweden, United Kingdom before 1855 (Mitchell 1975, table 11); United Kingdom after
1855 (Feinstein 1972, table 61); United States (U.S. Bureau of Census 1960).527 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
against the variance of nominal income 0"; for the years of the gold
standard, 1881 to 1913. If the model adequately characterizes the econ-
omy'sresponsetonominal-income shocks, a negative relationshipshould
be displayed. No such relationship emerges.
I8 Onepossible explanationis
relatively little variabililty in the nominal-income variances across the
countriesin thesample (table 11.6, col. 5), in comparison, say, toLucas's
study. There are nooutlierslike ArgentinaorParaguaywith an order-of-
magnitude dIfference in nominal-income variance from the rest of the
sample. Ifoneexcludesthesetwoobservationsfrom Lucas'ssample, then
the negative relationship between 11' and 0"; for his results is obscure as
well.
I9
Another way to view the data is to break the sample for each country
into subperiods and examine the patternof 11' and income variances. The
advantage ofthis procedure is that the value of'Y, theelasticityofsupply,
is more likely to be stable within a country than across countries. The
disadvantage is theunavailabilityofmanyperiodsso thatthe resultofthe
comparison must be informal rather than statistically rigorous.
Figure 11.2 plots the results of the exercise. In each case the first
observation plots 11' against the variance of nominal income in a period
priorto the years 1881-1913. Thesecond observation, the pointtowhich
the arrow is drawn, represents the combination of 11' and the nominal-
incomevariancein theperiod1881-1913. Splittingthe datain thisfashion












Fig. 11.1 The relationship between 7T and a;, 1953-67, and during the
gold standard years, 1881-1913. a; = variance of nominal
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Fig. 11.2 Valuesof7rand (1; beforeand afterthegold standardyears. (1;
= variance of nominal income x 10-5. Source: Table 11.6.
standard and a world on various alternative monetary arrangements;
some countries are formally on a bimetallic standard, some are floating,
and some are on a gold standard. For countries on a gold standard
throughout the period, as the United Kingdom was, splitting the data
before and after 1881 should reveal no change.
Figure 11.2 shows that in most cases the fall in the variance ofnominal
income during the gold standardperiod gave rise to an increase in 7T. The
exceptions, Canada and Germany, are also the countries in table 11.6 for
which the fits of the equations are the weakest. Italy is treated slightly
differently than the othercountries in figure 11.2 since the exchange rate
was fixed only from 1884 to 1894. The first arrow indicates the change
from pre-gOld standard years, 1863 to 1883, to the fixed-rate period, and
the second arrow points to the whole 1881-1913 era. Although there are
only a few observations, the behavior of 7T and 0'; in Italy is consistent
with the changes in nominal-income variance observed during the sub-
periods. Unlike the general decline in nominal-income variance during
the 1881-1913 decades, nominal-income variance in Italy increases be-
fore and after the period of the Italian gold standard decade. The two
countriesfor which 7T and0'; move in the "wrong"directionare Germany
and Canada, but in both countries the change in 7T is rather small. Thus
even this informal test yields mixed results. For most ofthe countries in529 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
the sample, behavior is consistent with the predictions ofthe theory, but
the pattern is not overwhelming.
In sum, there is some evidence to support this form ofthe model, and
some reasons why the evidence might be expected to be weak, but the
majorpredictions are disappointing. However, atleastonemoreelement
ofthe model deserves investigation-the assumption ofa unitary elastic-
ity ofaggregate demand, embodiedin the notion thatnominalincome or,
more precisely, the change in nominal income, is the relevant exogenous
variable.
11.2.3 International Interconnectedness
The major limitation of the Lucas model from an international per-
spective is that it ignores the possibility that countries are linked by
international arbitrage (McCloskey and Zecher1976). Ina gold standard
environment-one in which the exchange rate is rigid-domestic prices
depend upon foreign prices, and if the country is small and open, the
domestic price level is exogenous. In terms of the Lucas model, in
equation (3)-the aggregate-supply equation-the domestic price level
should be replaced by the foreign price level. Deviations of actual from
expected foreign prices would drive the model, making it necessary to
develop a price index for each country that reflected the relevant foreign
prices. An alternative would be to recast the theory, using world nom-
inal-income shocks as the relevant exogenous demandvariable, and then
predict world-price-Ievel changes and world-cyclical-output responses.
To avoid such constructions based on tenuous data, I pursued the
closed-economy version of the theory which assumes that there is ex-
ogeneityin domesticnominal-income shocks andthatdomesticprices are
at least in some measure determined by domestic demand and supply.
Since in section 11.1 no systematic causal relationship between nominal
or real incomes in our several countries was evident, that finding-
granted that only bilateral relationships were examined-serves as some
justification for eschewing the "world-scope" approach. If domestic
prices are rigidly linked to world prices, then equations (6) and (7) are
irrelevant, since world prices aredeterminedby world conditions andnot
simply by domestic nominal income. Let demand be characterized by Yt
= - ~Pt + Xt where ~ becomes very large. In that case neither equation
(6) nor equation (7) is relevant, since 1T = e'Y/(~ + e'Y), which means
equation (3) must include some index of foreign prices.
This concern leads to a test of the model. Does the specification in
equations (6) and (7) fit the data? In particular, is there evidence that
changes in measured price levels for each country are set in international
markets so that the demand schedule facing each country is highly elas-
tic? If we enforce the restriction that ~ = 1, then the RZ's in table 11.6(8)
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provide a general test of goodness of fit. If we estimate ~, assuming an
exactfit (i.e., theerrorsareexactlyzero) for equations (6) and (7), wecan
testthe restriction that ~ = 1 (Arak 1977) and also testwhetherthe exact
form of the model is appropriate (Lucas 1977).
If ~ =F 1, then.li~ and Yct may be written as:
(1 - A) Ut
IiPt = ~o + ---Yct-l +--,
~ e~ + ~
(9) _ e~
Yct - AYct-l +--Ut ,
e~ + ~
where Ut is the error associated with nominal disturbances.2o
The coefficients ofYct-l in the two equations allow us to construct an
estimate of~,thepriceelasticityofdemandfor realoutput;regressingthe
residualsofequation(8) ontheresidualsofequation(9) gives anestimate
of e~, the supply response to an unexpected change in prices; and the R
2
of the regression which regresses the residuals of equation (8) on the
residuals of equation (9) allows us to test the assumption that the exact
version of the model is appropriate since the errors should be propor-
tional and the R2 high.
Table 11.7presentsthevalues ofAand ~ andthe approximate standard
errors. The final column reports the R2 of the residuals regression. The
R2,s ofboth equation (8) and (9) are uniformly low, as expected, and are
notreported. TheR2ofregressingtheresidualsofequation (8) andon the
residuals ofequation (9), reportedin thefinal column, are also uniformly
low and sometimes negative. Recall that it is a homogenous regression.




A (1- A)/~ ~ on residuals
(s.e) (s.e) (s.e.)a of eq. (9)
Canada
1869-1913 .63 -.04 -9.25 .0
(.12) (.08) (18.26)
1869-1881 .52 .18 2.7 .04
(.29) (.19) (2.38)
1881-1913 .70 -.10 -3.0 .0
(.13) (.09) (2.37)
Germany
1853-1913 .58 .00 **** .01
(.10) (.16) ****
1853-1879 .44 -.40 -1.65 -.02
(.17) (.27) (1.03)
1879-1913 .71 .43 .67 .02





A (1- A)/~ ~ on residuals
(s.e) (s.e) (s.e.)a of eq. (9)
Italy
1862-1913 .87 -.01 -13.0 .09
(.08) (.11) (142.78)
1866-1883 .51 .10 5.0 .01
(.19) (.43) (26.20)
1884-1894 .61 .06 6.4 .10
(.31) (.46) (48.0)
1895-1913 .89 -.32 -.47 .20
(.11) (.11) (-)
Norway
1892-1913 .96 .30 .13 .01
(.14) (.43) (.47)
Sweden
1862-1913 .68 .05 6.4 .07
(.11) (.11) (13.91)
1862-1879 .65 -.04 -8.75 .09
(.18) (.20) (43.52)
1881-1913 .71 .22 1.3 .06
(.15) (.15) (.56)
United Kingdom
1832-1913 .79 .06 3.5 .04
(.07) (.17) (9.85)
1832-1859 .73 .31 .87 .20
(.13) (.49) (1.31)
1832-1879 .79 .18 1.2 .07
(.24) (.09)
1881-1913 .78 - .16 -1.3 .0
(.19) (.10)
United States
1831-1859 .61 .12 3.25 .02
(.15) (.14) (3.58)
187{}-1913 .67 .07 4.7 .16
(.11) (.07) (4.42)
1881-1913 .68 -.05 -6.4 .05
(.12) (.06) (7.3)
Sources: Same as for table 11.6.
aSE(O ""C ~J[VARe ~ A) - ~VAR(l- A)jV2.
The exact specification of the model is thus rejected by the data. I have
not reported estimated values ofthe coefficient e~ that were statistically
significant attheusualconfidencelevel inonly two ofthetwenty-five orso
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In general, the values of ~ are quite erratic, and although they do not
reject ~ = 1, they tend to be uncomfortably large, especially for the
smaller countries, Canada and Sweden.
11.3 Conclusion
What is the upshot ofthis study? The Lucas model, a model that does
not explicitly take account ofinternational links among countries, is only
broadly conformable to the evidence. The most powerful implication-
the relationship between the coefficient on nominal-income change (7r)
and the variance of nominal-income percentage changes (a;)-is not
supported by simple cross-sectional evidence. Higher and lower nomi-
nal-income-variance episodes, however, in individual countries do lend
some support to that relationship. Our test of the restrictions that de-
mand elasticity was unitary is not very powerful. Although the result is
consistent with the restriction, it is also usually consistent with high-
elasticity estimates. A high elasticity would be expected if prices in
different countries were closely linked to one another-ifthe world were
filled with small openeconomies. Price behaviormay conform to the rule
of international arbitrage, since a measure of that behavior discussed
above responds in a predictable fashion to shocks in nominal income.
In section 11.1 little evidence emerged that either real or nominal
output was causally related in a bivariate fashion among countries. The
evidence suggests that nominal (and real) shocks may be generated in
part domestically (or the evidence suggests no single international
source). The attempt to capture international links in section 11.2 was
only partly successful. There are two possible routes to follow in future
work to explain real- or nominal-income behavior. One route is to
construct a set ofworld prices and aggregate shocks that may impinge on
individual countries, each ofwhich would be small. The other route is to
gather additional data-perhapsquarterly orsemiannual observations-
and use vector autoregressions to discover whether blocs of countries
provide the links among nations. Finally, one general conclusion to be
drawn from this study is that during the gold standard years the bilateral
links among national incomes were not particularly strong in a causal
sense and that at least some observed domestic-price and real-output
behavior is explicable on the assumption that the price elasticity of
aggregate demand is not infinite. Economies appear to have been less
small than might have been anticipated, but the issue is still open.533 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
Appendix
Figure 11.A.l contains a plot ofvalues of 'IT andrr; from bothLucas 1973
and table 11.6.
Tables ll.A.l and 11.A.2 illustrate the results for some of the coun-
tries in the sample when the absolute value of output deviations of one
country are assumed to Granger-cause the output deviations of another








Values of 7T and (1;, 1953-67, and during the gold standard
years, 1881-1913. (1; = variance of nominal income x 10-5.
The black circles are drawn from Lucas 1973, tables 1 and 2;
the white ones are drawn from fig. 11.1. Source: Lucas 1973,
table 6.
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Table II.A.l Granger Causal Links between National Absolute Values of Output
Deviations, 1881-1913: Values of the F-test
u.s. U.K. Germany Canada
U.S. X 2.74 0.56
U.K. 0.85 X 1.14 1.24
Germany 0.83 X
Canada 0.75 6.69 X
Source: Same as table 11.3.534 Stephen T. Easton
Table 11.A.2 Granger Causal Links between National Absolute Values of Output
Deviations, Full Sample Years: Values of the F-test
U.S. U.K. Germany Canada Italy
U.S. X 0.19 0.62 0.78
U.K. 1.68 X 1.10 1.95 1.66
Germany 0.89 X 0.24
Canada 0.16 4.69 X
Italy 1.43 1.07 X
Source: Same as table 11.4.
tions. A high F means that the row country Granger-causes the column
country. In tables II.A.I and II.A.2, the only significant F, at the 95
percent confidence level, is for Canada Granger-causing the United
Kingdom. Thus, as is the case when causation is based on the algebraic
value of output deviations from trend, the absolute values of the devia-
tions also reveal little binational linkage among countries. Although
potentially a weaker restriction of Granger-causation between national
outputs, the test based on the latterset nonetheless reveals no significant
pattern.
Notes
1. For a summary of the gold standard years see Yeager 1966, pp. 251-65. A more
detailed discussion may be found in Hawtrey 1935 and, for the UnitedStatesandthe United
Kingdom, in Bordo 1981.
2. Both France and the United States were officially on a bimetallicstandard-goldand
silver-but large changes in available quantities made official ratios, approximately 15:1 in
the UnitedStates and 15.5:1 in France, toogreat to be sustained; thus the UnitedStateswas
effectively on a gold standard for much of the period 1834-59. Since we were unable to
unearthrealoutputdatafor France, no morewill be said aboutthis interestinginteractionof
France with the rest of the world.
3. Countries joined the gold standard at different times and some dropped out for
various periods. Russia and Japan both joined in 1897. Italy was a member of the gold
standard "club"onlybetween 1884 and 1894 (FratianniandSpinelli, this volume), although
Bloomfield (1959, p. 13) has dated the period as 1883-91. Austria-Hungary was never
legally on gold, although Bloomfield suggests that its exchange rate was stable relative to
gold from 1900 to 1914; Argentina left gold in 1885 and returned in 1900. Bulgaria left in
1899 only to return in 1906. Othercountries dropped out at various times: Portugal (1890),
Chile (1898), and Mexico (1910). Spain was not associated with the gold standard, and
China, EI Salvador, and Honduras remained on a silver standard.
4. See McCloskey and Zecher 1976, pp. 357-85 in which they cite much ofthe standard
literature associated with these questions.
5. Choudhri and Kochin 1980 have a good discussion ofthe different models available.535 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
6. There is an extensive literature on "staple" models ofgrowth and development. See,
for example, North 1966, Chambers and Gordon 1966, Dales 1966, and Williamson 1980.
7. For a more detailed discussion of efforts to identify business cycles, see McCulloch
1975 and Neftci 1979.
8. The United Kingdom may still have been a hub for some countries. We have no
evidence on the association ofoutput between the United Kingdom, Australia, Argentina,
and India, to name a few. It is important to stress that Thomas, in particular, is concerned
with long swings whereas I examine year-to-year fluctuations.
9. Oneofthe keyproblemsofthis methodologyis to determinetheappropriatelengthof
the lags. In principle they may be infinite. In tables 1L3-1L5 reported here, lags up to six
periods, and, when relevant, leads ofsix periods are reported. An F-test on additional lags
(and leads) indicated no significant effects beyond those reported in the tables.
10. To assess the degree to which the nations shown in table 1L3 are causally indepen-
dent, assume that each causal interaction-each of the 56 elements of table 11.3--is
independent, then at the 0.05 confidence level, 0.05 x 56 of the elements would be
statistically significant by chance. We use the binomial distribution-approximated from
the central-limit theorem by a normal distribution-to calculate the probability that the 6
significant elemerits actuallyfound are dueto chan~e. Thenull hypothesisis thatthe number
ofsignificant elements is 2.8(= 0.05 x 56); the alternative is that the observed number is
greater than 2.8. Calculate the standard value <f>:
<f> = 6/56 - 2.8/56 = L96.
"I (.05) (.95)
V 56
The hypothesis that the observed pattern is random at the 0.05 confidence level is rejected
when L96 is compared to a normal distribution.
But there are two obvious problems with each procedure: only integer values of the
numberofsignificant relationships is possible, and the trials may not be independent. Allow
3 to be the "expected" number ofrandom significant relationships, then <f> = 1.84. Choose
the confidence level consistent with 3 significant relationships, .054, then <f> = L78. These
calculations still give some evidence supporting the hypothesis that the patternofobserved
causallinks is nonrandom. Thereis a sortof"catch-22" qualityto theexperiment, however,
since the calculations assume that the trials were independent. That assumption is surely at
risk ifincomein countryA causesincomeincountryB andcountryC, andincomein country
B appears to cause income in country C as well. Consider in table 11.3 that Sweden causes
both Italy and Denmark. But Denmark causes Italy too. The observed causation is very
possibly spurious and surely reflects an interdependence. Eliminating the potentially spu-
rious relationship and computing <f>, which is equal to L35, means that the observed
distributionofsignificantelementsdoes notdifferfrom thatexpectedfrom a randomsample
at the 0.05 confidence level. (At the 0.10 confidence level there are 8untainted interactions
and again <f> falls below the critical level.) A vector autoregression to see whetherDenmark
explained any additional variation once Sweden was accounted for was negative, but there
were relatively few degrees offreedom. The fact that loss ofa single observation drives the
observed pattern well into the range consistent with random behavior at the 0.05 level
provides additional support for the claim that the pattern of table 11.3 is not significant.
Carrying out the same procedure at the higher confidence levels 0.10 and0.25 yields similar
conclusions. Becauseit is so dependentonthe independenceofthe trials, this form of"test"
really gives only an upper bound on the number ofcausal links. The conclusion is thatwith
any sort ofsimple correction for interdependence, table 1L3 does not support the hypoth-
esis that real outputs of countries were firmly linked during the gold standard period.
11. The results of the Sims test are usually similar to those found by the Granger
methods. I find no reason to preferone testover anotherwith these dataalthoughFeige and536 Stephen T. Easton
Pearce 1979 report the Sims test to be very sensitive to the prefilter used, and Geweke,
Meese, and Dent 1979 report other drawbacks.
12. Neftci 1979 reportsexperimentsalong these lines using contemporarydata. With the
small amount ofhistorical data available, however, vector autoregressions quickly use up
the limited number of degrees of freedom.
13. Table 11.3 was recast using nominal income instead of real income, consistent with
the approachin section 11.2thatconsiders nominal income the exogenousimpulse to which
output and prices respond. Unfortunately, the patterns of causation (not reported here)
were every bit as faint and erratic as those in table 11.3.
14. The natural-rate debate still burns hotly. See Phelps 1971, Barro and Fischer 1976,
and Azariadis 1981 for recent discussions.
15. For some criticisms of Lucas's (1973) model, see Arak 1977 and Lucas 1977.
16. The notation corresponds to Lucas 1973 for easy reference, but for simplicity omits
the market index Z.
17. Norway is an exceptionwith a 1.01 value of A.. Butthere areobservationsfor Norway
only from 1892 to 1913, and the standard error of the estimate is .14.
18. Thisis trueevenifwe ignoreCanada,for which theoutputdataare notoriouslypoor,
and Norway, for which the data, based on fewer observations than the rest, fit least well.
19. The Appendix shows a plot of 1T and A. from Lucas's (1973) post-World War II
estimates and from table 11.6 for 1881-1913.
20. Ifdemandis Yt = - ~Pt + Xtthen nominal incomeis Yt + Prso thatYt + Pt = (1 - ~)Pr
+ Xt• Only if ~ = 1is the exogenous shock ~t exactly equal to changes in nominal income.
In the context of equations (8) and (9), ~t = 8 + f.Lt, where 8 is a constant, the rate of
growth of nominal output.
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Comment Geoffrey E. Wood
Professor Easton's paper begins by telling us that the choice between
alternativemonetarystandardsshoulddependonwhichstandardleads to
the highest available level, or rate of growth, of output per head. That
notion (apartfrom anyminorqualificationsthatmightbemadeto regard-
ing output per head as the only measure of welfare) is surely correct.
What can money, neutral and therefore affecting only the price level in
the long run, contribute to the level or rate ofgrowth of real output? In
view of its neutrality, money's only contribution can be to increase the
predictability ofthe future price level. The crucial test that should guide
us in choosing between the gold standard and all other monetary stan-
dards is therefore a comparison ofprice-level predictability under differ-
ent monetary systems. This test is not among the large number of tests
whose results are reported in Professor Easton's paper. Its absence
suggests an uncertainty of aim which led to failure to link economic
analysis with an examination ofthe data. This failure, it will be argued, is
the crucial one which produced the defects in Professor Easton's paper.
The comments that follow are divided into four sections. First, the
questions Professor Easton addresses are summarized. The answers he
produces are then discussed. Third, some details in the paper are ex-
amined. The comments then conclude with a summary of the lessons of
this paper.
The Questions
Professor Easton uses data drawn from a wide range ofcountries, over
a long run of years, to address the following questions.
Geoffrey E. Wood is Reader in Banking and International Finance at the City Univer-
sity, London.
Heis indebtedfor discussion ofthese comments to Charles Goodhartand ForrestCapie.539 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
1. Is there any evidence of correlation, or causal influences, or both,
between real-income movements in these countries?
2. Does whatever relationship existed between real-income move-
ments in different countries before 1879 change after that year, in which
the United States formally adopted the gold standard?
3. Is the output-inflation relationship hypothesized by Robert E.
Lucas, and tested in his 1973 paper, found in the data of this period?
4. Is the price level "more appropriately characterized as endogenous
or exogenous to most countries during the period" (p. 514)?
Briefly, Easton's answers to the first two questions are "no," to the
thirdatentative "yes,"andto thefourth, "insome countriestheelasticity
of aggregate demand is very large" (p. 514).
The Answers in Detail
Output Fluctuations
Easton's examination ofthe relationship among output fluctuations is
best considered in two separate sections. First he looks at correlations
among various countries of annual deviations of the log of actual GNP
from the log oftrend GNP. Hefinds that by this measure there is, during
1830-79, a good degree of association of output fluctuations within
Europe, but no association of any significance between Europe and
North America. After 1879 (when the United States resumed the gold
standard), the United States becomes involved in this pattern ofcorrela-
tion, as to a lesser extent does Canada.
Sometimes the correlations are negative and sometimes positive. This
result was noted earlier by Brinley Thomas (1954), and is indeed what
one would expect in a world where fluctuations in output about trend are
produced by a mixture ofdemand shocks and supply shocks. The reason
for this can be summarized very briefly.
Consider first a demand expansion. An expansion in demand in one
country resulting from, for example, a drop in the savings rate, would
under fixed rates "spill over" into the balance of payments as imports
rose and exports fell, thus increasing demand overseas.! So long as the
short-run aggregate supply curve were not vertical, there would be a
positive outputchange in bothcountries, andhence apositive correlation
between output movements.
We should not, however, expect a similar response to a supply fluctua-
tion. Consider the example ofan unexpected, favorable, supply shock in
one country. The shock would raise output and thereby increase the
demand for money. With a fixed exchange rate, funds are drawn in from
overseas, thus producingamonetarycontractionoverseas (unanticipated
because the supply shock was unanticipated). This squeeze will in turn,540 Stephen T. Easton
because of its being unanticipated, produce a recession overseas. Hence
if the income fluctuation originates in a supply shock, there will be a
negative correlation between income movements in different countries
under a fixed-exchange-rate regime. Therefore Easton's results, because
they essentially replicate Brinley Thomas's earlier work, and on analyti-
cal grounds, should so far be no surprise. So much for correlation.
Easton next proceeds to look for "causal" relationships, using Gran-
ger-Sims methods to identify timing patterns. He looks first at rela-
tionships amongfluctuations in nationalincome and then at relationships
among the absolute values of these national-income fluctuations. He
carries out these tests because
significant simple correlations among real output changes in many
countries provided no evidence of causal impetus. They do not by
themselves support the notion that the United Kingdom was the hub
around which at least some nations revolved. (P. 518)
Histests revealsomebilateralrelationships, butno strong, overwhelm-
ing connections. What do these negative findings indicate? A first and
basicpointis thathis tests have absolutelynothingto dowith the "engine-
of-growth" hypothesis. That hypothesis is concerned with national-
income trends; Easton's tests examine deviations from trend. If the
engine-of-growth hypothesis were thefocus ofthese tests (as is impliedin
the above quotation), then it can only be said that the tests were not well
chosen.
Dothe tests reveal anything? The answer is th~t theydo pro~ide a little
information. The first halfofthis section, which mixes together positive-
and negative-income correlations and looks for timing relationships be-
tween them, is totally pointless. Since we knew before carrying out the
tests that the sample period contained a mixture ofpositive and negative
correlations betweenincome fluctuations, we could have anticipatedthat
these would roughly offset each other, thus concealing whatever rela-
tionship might have existed. Looking at absolute values, as is done in the
second halfofthis "causality" section, avoids this problem. Byfinding no
clear lead-lag relationship among these fluctuations, Easton shows that
cycles in one country did not, by and large, have much of a systematic
timing relationship with cycles in another. That information is useful.
It must be stressed, however, that these tests have revealed nothing
aboutcausalityin the sense that A causes B, meaningthatthe occurrence
of A is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of B. There are very
few occasions in economicswhen the isolation ofa timing relationship, or
failure to isolate such a relationship, can confirm or refute a hypothesis.
The occasion on which Easton has used these tests is not one ofthem.
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The Lucas Hypothesis
It is useful first to quote from Lucas (1973).
The positive association of price changes and output arises because
suppliers misinterpret general price movements for relative price
changes. It follows from this view, first, that changes in average infla-
tion rates will not increase average output, and secondly, that the
higher the variance in average prices, the less "favorable" will be that
observed trade off.
Before this idea can be tested by cross-country comparisons as Lucas did
(and Easton does),3 there must be a good amount ofinflation variability
between countries. Is that likely to be found under the gold standard?
Here the arguments of McCloskey and Zecher, advanced both at this
conference (chap. 2) and in an earlier paper (1976), might become
important. They argue that commodity arbitrage was an important link
between countries under the gold standard. Ifthat argument is correct, it
is clearly impossible for countries in that period to differ significantly in
either their inflation rates or in their inflation-rate variability.
It is not, however, necessary for the purposes ofexamining Professor
Easton'spapertodecidewhetherMcCloskeyandZecherarecorrect. The
price indexes used by Easton are dominated by internationally traded
goods in which there was, certainly after the telegraph revolution ofthe
early1870s, quiteindisputablyveryclose arbitrage. Thebehaviorofthese
price indexes could not diverge substantially across countries.
Hencewhetherit would be possible to test the Lucas hypothesis onthis
period's data by use ofsome other price indexes remains an open ques-
tion. What is clear, though, is that given the indexes used by Easton, it is
impossible for the gold standard years after 1870 to give confirmation of
the Lucas hypothesis. Even if that hypothesis described the world per-
fectly, the world could by its nature not generate data on which the
hypothesis could be tested.
In view of this, what do Professor Easton's findings tell us? He found
some modest confirmation of the Lucas hypothesis before 1879, but
essentially none after. This is encouraging for the hypothesis. Before
1879 prices were tied together less closely than they were afterwards;
before 1879 not all the countries in his sample were on the gold standard,
and because of poorer communications, arbitrage in traded goods oc-
curred more slowly than it did after that date. His findings can therefore
be described as being consistent with the Lucas hypothesis, although it
cannotbe claimed as confirmationofit.
4Easton'sinformalwork, in which
he uses .graphical methods and (very sensibly) breaks the period into
before and after the gold standard, provides some support for this view.
His tests for the price elasticity of demand for each country's output542 Stephen T. Easton
are, as he admits, so inconclusive as to beconsistentwith almost anyprior
expectation.
Points of Detail
Three details ofProfessor Easton's paper require comment. First, the
choice of countries can best be described as eclectic. It is curious to
include the Scandinavian countries and exclude Belgium, the Nether-
.lands, France, Argentina, India, and Australia. These were important
countries in the system-a fact surely outweighed by the relatively poor
data available. In particular, Australia was a most important member of
the periphery. It is justnot good enough to write (footnote 8), "Wehave
no evidence on the association ofoutput between the United Kingdom,
Australia, Argentina, and India, to name a few." The data to seek that
evidence do exist; the omission of, certainly, Australia and Argentina is
of sufficient importance that it should have been either rectified or
justified.
Second, his ratherharsh strictures onMorgenstern (1959) andThomas
(1954) are totally unjustified. Morgenstern, he writes, did not "abstract
from the underlying growth rate"-but that is surely sensible if one is
interested in relations among economies over a long period of years.
With regard to Thomas, the assertion that it is difficult to accept infer-
ences about the relationships among cycles because Thomas looks at
cycles of varying amplitude and duration is certainly not self-evidently
true-but it is presented as if it were.
Third, some of the results he obtained are (as in some cases he notes
himself) distinctly odd. For example, from 1879 Canada's income
fluctuations appear associated with those ofthe United States, and those
of the United States are associated with those of the United Kingdom.
But no association is found between Canadian and United Kingdom
income fluctuations. Turning to patterns of causality, there are ·some
most curious findings. Germany "causes" U.K. fluctuations, Denmark
and Sweden "cause" Italian fluctuations, but Norwegian fluctuations,
although correlatedwith those in Denmarkand Sweden, do notappearto
join fluctuations in those two countries in "causing" Italian fluctuations.
These findings may result from the omission ofsome third variable from
the bivariate causality tests. But it is much more likely that they are the
chance result of extensive manipulation of poor-quality data.
The Lessons of the Paper
What does this papertell us? The author himselfdoes notseemsure; if
we read the concluding section, we find proposalsfor future work, butno
clear statement of what has been achieved. In fact, four lessons emerge
very clearly from the paper. First, it confirms that a fairly predictable
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the real economy. That confirmation is useful. Second, it demonstrates
that in the gold standard period looking at individual episodes is helpful,
while examining the period as a whole on balance conceals information.
Third, thepaperis a useful reminderofthedangersoftakingatface value
the results ofthe extensive and elaborate statistical manipulation ofnot
particularly reliable data. Fourth, and perhaps most important, it shows
very clearly just how necessary it is to consider analytically the question
being addressed before rushing at the data with a battery of statistical
techniques.
Notes
1. This alleviation of demand pressure was known in the United Kingdom during the
Bretton Woods era as the "problem" of the balance of payments. For discussion of the
cyclical behaviorofthe United Kingdom's balance ofpayments in this period, see William-
son and Wood 1976.
2. Two further points should be noted on the use of Granger-Sims tests in this paper.
First, although two references are cited that suggest Granger'smethods are superior, aSims
test is used in one instance without an indication of why it was chosen. Second, "To
supplement the Grangercausal relationships, table 11.5 uses a Sims test to examine the full
range of data available for each country" (p. 520). Now one thing Granger-Sims methods
have revealed quite unambiguously is the importance of the exchange-rate regime for
relationships between countries. See e.g., Mills and Wood 1978. Thus simply flinging
together data from different exchange-rate regimes could certainly not help reveal any
"causal" relationships; indeed, it is more likely to conceal them.
3. It should be pointed out that Easton takes no account of the comments of Neil
Wallace on Lucas (1973), which Lucas acknowledged in a note (1976) to be of some
importance to the interpretation of his paper. As Easton's paper is affected by a different
and prior flaw, however, this issue is not pursued here.
4. Easton points to the lack of cross-country inflation variability as the reason for the
failure of the test, but does not seem to grasp why it occurred or what it implies.
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Discussion of Huffman-Lothian
and Easton Papers
MELTZERcommentedontheview thatseemedto prevailin the preceding
sessions to the effect that institutions didn't matter: Sweden's growth
didn't matter; it didn't matterif Sweden was on the gold standard ornot;
Italy not being on the gold standard didn't matter; nothing seemed to
matter. This session's papers and the comments on them raise an impor-
tant issue because they ask the question whetherin fact and in which way
did institutions matter.
Suppose the fluctuations are entirely random, random mixtures of
supply and demandshocks. Whatis random andwhat is not randomwith
respect to prices is not independent ofthe perceptions that people have,
what they expect prices are going to do, and how long these movements
are going to persist; surely that set of beliefs depends very much on the
nature ofthe monetary system. The proposition may be a difficult one to
test, butit certainly is notimpossible to test-thatthe monetary rule, the
fiscal rule, and the agreements thatpeople have made among themselves
andbetweencountrieshavesomethingtodowith thewayinwhich cycles,
price movements, exchange-rate movements, monetary movements
occur. Thefact thatwe don'tfind in patternsofshocks exactlywhatmight
be expected from a rigid interpretation ofthese arrangementsshould not
immediately lead to the view that the arrangements don't matter at
all-that what the rule is or what kind of monetary system we have
doesn't matter.
It would seem a little early to dismiss the importance of rules, one
reason being thatthe nature ofwhat is considered a permanentdeviation
and what is considered simply transitory white noise might be very
different. Forexample, compare the Irish potatofamine and its effect on
prices in England, where the price of wheat apparently doubled or
trebledduringthe course ~fa very shortperiodoftime andthenfell by 50
percent, to theuncertaintygeneratedin themoderneconomybyasimilar
rise in the price of oil. In the earlier episode, under the prevailing
institutions ofBritain, no oneexpectedprice controlsto be putonwheat,
no oneexpectedanyofthekinds ofpoliciesthatwouldbeverylikelytobe
high on the list ofwhat one might expect when similar shocks take place
today. So I hope that the monetary and fiscal rule will be considered to545 Real Output and the Gold Standard Years, 1830-1913
have more importance than was being assigned to it earlier in the confer-
ence.
BARRO, commenting on Easton's paper, pointed out an error in the
version ofthe Lucas model that was utilized. In point offact, the output
and inflation equations in the model are not independent. The inflation
equation is just the first difference ofthe output equation. Thus, there is
no point to estimating separately the output equation and the inflation
equation.
DORNBUSCH indicated that in reading the Lothian-Huffman paper, he
was unable to link the theoretical and empirical sections of the essay.
MCCLOSKEY started with a general comment. There comes a point, he
suggested, when the results offitting hyperplanes to time-series data are
so strange that one must question the advisability ofthe exercise. In the
Huffman-Lothian paper, for example, there is a one-year lag in the
adjustment ofinterest rates to external shocks. One can imagine certain
circumstances in which such an adjustment lag might exist, but the
foregone profitopportunitiesseem tremendous. Thus, this resultmust be
treated skeptically.
McCloskey went on to quarrel with the way the word "significance"
was used in these papers as a basis for making inferences. In fact, all the
"significance" level indicates is the probability of type-one error.
LOTHIAN accepted McCloskey's first point. Their paper was not an
attempt to present an explicit test of interest arbitrage. The authors
merely wanted to have interest rates in the model.
THOMAS commented on Easton's paper. In his introduction, Easton
states that there is little evidence of an Atlantic economy as far as real
income movementsareconcerned. Thatstatementis basedonan analysis
of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy,
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Yet the term "Atlantic economy" was
chosen to represent the United Kingdom and a periphery ofdeveloping
countries, namely, countries of recent settlement overseas-not all of
themin oraroundthe Atlanticocean. Itis quite clearin theliteraturethat
the Atlantic economy includes countries such as Canada, the United
States, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand. The rather eccentric set
of countries considered in Easton's paper could not possibly warrant a
conclusion about the existence of an Atlantic economy.
ABRAMOVITZ elaborated upon Thomas's point. There is another sense
in which the selection of countries and the uniform treatment of the
whole period is unrepresentative ofthe notion ofthe Atlantic economy.
Consider the question of migration from European countries to the
United States. The links between the United States and the various
European countries were changing over time. Immigration occurred as
European nations entered their periods of industrialization and the
movement from their farms began. For example, before the U.S. Civil546 Stephen T. Easton
War German immigration began, followed after the war by immigration
from Scandinavia, then Italy, and so on. Changes in the linkages among
countries must be taken into account.
EASTON commented on his usage of the phrase "Atlantic economy."
He argued that all the countries he dealt with were closely related to one
another. His footnote 8 carefully distinguishes his hypothesis from the
hypothesis with which Brinley Thomas was concerned. Thomas is con-
cerned with the long swing, whereas Easton is looking at year-to-year
fluctuations. While the United Kingdom may still have beenan economic
hub for some countries, there is no evidence ofany association ofoutput
between the United Kingdom, Australia, Argentina, and India.
LOTHIAN acknowledge the problematic nature of the real-income esti-
mates used in the Huffman-Lothian paper. Regarding the use of vector
autoregressions, he acknowledged that the authors had reported some
peculiarcorrelations. However, they hadbeencareful notto make strong
assertions on the basis of such results. Lothian also addressed one of
Dornbusch's comments regarding the paper's emphasis on monetary
variables. The authors had begun their inquiry with the presumptionthat
monetary shocks were important but that real shocks might have mat-
tered also. DornbuschandFrenkelmay be right that a harvestfailure was
the cause of a particular decrease in the gold stock. Yet the question
remains: Is there then feedback from the endogenous changes in money
to the real side ofthe economy? Are majormonetary fluctuations associ-
ated with subsequent real-income fluctuations? Granger's and Sims's
methodology provides a technique for distinguishing the influence ofreal
and monetary variables.
HUFFMAN commented that note 11 of the paper describes at some
length the problems of interpreting Granger tests. It is well known that
coefficients on successive lag values of a given variable will oscillate in
sign. Huffman and Lothian report the results ofawide range oftestswith
the aim of providing different pictures of the relationships among vari-
ables. Not all of the pictures necessarily lead to the same conclusions.
Huffman suggested that one's priors make a difference in how one
interprets the results. However, in Huffman's view, there are plausible
interpretations for most of the results the authors present.